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ABSTRACT: The article supports the proposal for a critical neurohermeneutics. For this purpose it 
begins by considering the recently coined term «neurohermeneutics» and the various meanings it 
contains. The article then explores neurohermeneutics as the hermeneutics of neuroscience, and 
identifies some of the main limitations of naturalistic neuroethics that arise from the deficit of critical 
hermeneutics in its approaches. Finally, critical hermeneutics is defended as the necessary foundation 
of neuroethics. 
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Neurohermenéutica crítica
RESUMEN: El artículo defiende la propuesta de una neurohermenéutica crítica. Para ello parte del 
término recientemente acuñado «neurohermenéutica» y de los diversos significados que éste contiene. 
Centrándonos en la neurohermenéutica como hermenéutica de la neurociencia, destacamos algunas 
de las principales limitaciones de la neuroética naturalista como consecuencia del déficit crítico-
hermenéutico de sus planteamientos. La «fenomenología de la autoría responsable» que Habermas 
presenta en algunos de sus últimos escritos nos sirve de marco desde el que poder ir perfilando 
nuestro modelo de neurohermenéutica crítica y así poder superar las deficiencias de la neuroética 
naturalista. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: neurohermenéutica; neuroética; neuromito; Habermas.
1. fRom PhiloSoPhiCal heRmeneutiCS to PhiloSoPhiCal neuRoheRmeneutiCS 
Since its emergence in the seventeenth century, the word hermeneutics has 
referred to the science or art of interpretation. Until the end of the nineteenth 
century, it usually took the form of a theory that promised to lay out the rules 
governing the discipline of interpretation [...] Philosophical hermeneutics, by 
comparison, is of very recent date.1
The term «hermeneutics» is of Greek origin and was actually coined in the 
seventeenth century to refer to what was formerly called ars interpretandi, and 
that brought together branches such as criticism, exegesis and philology. It is 
then that the first treatises on the general art of interpretation emerged to go 
beyond the framework of specialised hermeneutics, understood as techniques 
dedicated in particular to biblical writings or works of classical antiquity. It 
was, however, in the nineteenth century with authors such as Schleiermacher, 
August Boekth, Bratuschek, Droysen and, above all, Wilhelm Dilthey and 
Georg Misch, that hermeneutics broadened its interpretive horizon, gaining 
* This publication has been supported by the Scientific Research and Development project 
PID2019-109078RB-C22 funded by the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities.
1 GRondin, J., Introduction to philosophical hermeneutics, New Haven/London, Yale 
University Press, 1994, pp. 1-2.
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progressive awareness of and reflection on the historical dimension, and 
projected as a scientific methodology of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften)2.
However, the fundamental shift in the way hermeneutics is currently 
understood arrived with Heidegger, and especially with Gadamer. At this point, 
hermeneutics no longer simply designated a practice, a theory or a methodology, 
but essentially a fundamental characteristic of the human being. It was a 
fundamental and radically philosophical turn because hermeneutics became 
a universal feature of the human condition and with it, of all philosophical 
activity that is known from the interpretative dimension of the human being. 
With the passage of time the presence of philosophical hermeneutics has 
gained increasing relevance and prominence in the world of philosophy. The 
Gadamerian matrix of philosophical hermeneutics has been applied to analyse 
a range of issues and problems that affect the human being and our world 
today. It is not only that hermeneutics has something to say about these issues 
from a particular point of view of the human sciences, but that saying or talking 
about something, also from the natural sciences, implies the human capacity to 
interpret. This capacity is clearly enlightened by philosophical hermeneutics. 
It is therefore hardly possible to speak of our current conception of the world 
without referring (explicitly or tacitly) to the interpretative dimension of the 
human being.
Among the issues that have come to the fore is the impact of the neurosciences. 
In the last two decades there has been a major proliferation of disciplines 
accompanied by the prefix «neuro» (neuroethics, neuropolitics, neurophilosophy, 
neuroeducation, neurodidactic, neuroaesthetic, neurorhetoric, neuroeconomy, 
neuromarketing, neurolaw, neurotheology, and so on)3. The presence of «neuro» 
is not limited to academic circles or specialists, but is shaping a new conception 
of the world that is infiltrating a peculiar way of understanding it and of 
understanding ourselves, in which the brain is taken as the centre of operations, 
as the core of all kinds of human activity.
It might seem that any discipline can be understood under the aegis of the 
neurosciences. Undoubtedly, «neuro» is topical and, in my opinion, has given rise 
to the urgent hermeneutic-philosophical problem of whether the new science 
of the brain is capable of giving reason to everything to the point of becoming 
the new common language and the centre of operations of any discipline. All 
2 For a historical reconstruction of the term hermeneutics, see the work of GRondin, J., 
Introduction to philosophical hermeneutics, op. cit. For this purpose the work of FeRRaRiS, 
M., History of hermeneutics, Humanities Press, 1996, is also illustrative. On philosophical 
hermeneutics see also Conill, J., Ética hermenéutica. Crítica desde la facticidad, Madrid, 
Tecnos, 2006. The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and method, is a paradigmatic 
reconstruction of the history of hermeneutics.
3 The number of words generated is already legion and includes such diverse examples as 
neurodeterminism, neuroexceptionalism, neuroessentialism, neurorealism, neuroseduction 
or neurohype. Cf. IlleS, J., «Neurologism», American Journal of Bioethics-Neuroscience, nº 9 
(9), p. 1, 2009; Lilienfeld, S. O.; ASlingeR, E.; MaRShall, J. and Satel, S., «Neurohype» in: The 
Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics, London, Routledge.
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areas of knowledge would be rooted, so to speak, in the neurosciences, each 
according to its modality. Several questions therefore arise: are neurosciences 
the new language of our time? Should we move on to speak or even replace 
the philosophical hermeneutics with a «philosophical neurohermeneutics» 
at the height of these «neuro» times? What relationship is established, or 
rather must be established, between the philosophical hermeneutics and the 
neurosciences? Should we now assume that we are facing a new hermeneutic 
paradigm modulated by the neurosciences? As we move from a plurality of 
possible interpretations to a single valid explanation in terms of neuroscience, 
does this paradigm imply a new version of hermeneutics, or a dissolution of the 
hermeneutic dimension?4.
The relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and neurosciences is 
complex and multifaceted. I do not intend to explore each one of its angles 
in this paper. However, there are many questions that should be raised and 
analysed, because depending on the response they elicit, a particular way of 
doing science and doing philosophy will result. The clarification of the concepts 
continues to be one of the main tasks of philosophy and in what follows I 
analyse whether it is possible to speak of a «philosophical neurohermeneutics» 
and more precisely a «critical neurohermeneutics», and in what sense or senses 
it is possible to do so.
The term «neurohermeneutics» is also beginning to appear in the literature. 
As in the early days of neuroethics, when the distinction was made between the 
neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience5 at the now famous San 
Francisco conference in 2002, the hermeneutics of neuroscience has also been 
distinguished from the neuroscience of hermeneutics6. The hermeneutics of 
neuroscience refers to exploring the contribution of the hermeneutical approach 
by analysing what particular interpretation of the world and of ourselves 
the neurosciences offer. It therefore seeks to highlight the hermeneutical 
presuppositions of neuroscience.
In contrast, the neuroscience of hermeneutics refers to discovering the 
neural bases of our definition of human beings as interpretative beings capable 
of understanding themselves. This second approach concerns the ability to 
detect the brain mechanisms involved in creating stories, which Kay Young 
and Jeffrey Saber have called the «neurology of narrative». Studies using brain 
4 Nearly three decades ago Gianni Vattimo referred to hermeneutics as the «new koine» 
of our time. Cf. Vattimo, G., «Hermenéutica: nueva koiné», in: Ética de la interpretación, 
Paidós, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 55-71. 
5 Cf. RoSKieS, A., «Neuroscience for the new Millenium», Neuron 35, 2002, 21-23. In 
view of the investigations in more than fifteen years since its emergence, it is undoubtedly a 
very fruitful distinction that has served to generate different ways of analysis and research. 
Neuroethics as a neuroscience of ethics is not only an applied ethics inscribed within the 
framework of bioethics, but it also implies and involves philosophical reflection on fundamental 
issues of ethics such as identity, recognition, freedom, the concept of morality, and so on.
6 Cf. Domingo, T., «Neurohermenéutica», in: Pensamiento, Vol. 73, 276 (2017), pp. 
563-568. 
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scans such as electroencephalography (EEG) or functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) allow us to generate a vision, according to these authors, «of how 
the brain narratively organizes its experience». They go on to state that «Recent 
advances in cognitive neuroscience suggest that the creation of narrative in the 
human central nervous system is mediated by a regionally distributed neural 
network»7. In this line, authors like Steve Reyna have alluded to the parts of 
the brain involved in the interpretation as the «neurohermeneutic system of 
interpretation» and have tried to find the link between the biological substrate 
of the brain and the cultural dimension of interpretation8. 
In this work I will focus on neurohermeutics as a philosophical hermeneutics 
of neuroscience. I introduce the adjective philosophical to emphasise that the 
hermeneutic analysis of neuroscience does not designate only a particular 
practice or methodology but the fundamental characteristic of the human being 
as an interpreter and configurer of various theories and ways of understanding 
the world and nature.
2. the heRmeneutiCal defiCit of (unCRitiCal) natuRaliStiC neuRoethiCS 
Among the diverse range of «neuro» disciplines, neuroethics has gained 
special relevance and, within it, the neuroscience of ethics. Ethical questions are 
once again being posed from new approaches supported by the neurosciences. 
In this process, interesting enquiries have arisen about the relationship between 
science and philosophy, but a particular type of ethics is also being shaped and 
informed by neuroscientific research.
It would be unjustified to ignore the contribution of neuroscience to the 
study of ethical issues such as morality, human nature, freedom, identity, 
recognition, rationality or emotions, among others. In my view, philosophy in 
general and ethics in particular cannot turn its back on scientific advances9. 
However, from the other, philosophical, side I think it is crucial to stop and 
ask whether the neuroscientific research that seeks to clarify ethical issues is 
and has been able to enlighten them adequately. Has it considered the scope 
of morality in all its breadth and complexity, without incurring in distorting 
reductionisms? On this point, I consider that some neuroethical versions 
suffer from a hermeneutical deficit. This is the case of (uncritical) naturalistic 
neuroethics, which consists in reducing the explanation of moral behaviour 
to the neurophysiological mechanisms described by the neurosciences. The 
7 Cf. Young, K. & SabeR, J. L., «The neurology of narrative», in SubStance, 94/95, 2001, 
p. 188. 
8  Cf. Reyna, S., «What is interpretation? A cultural neurohermeneutic account», 
European Journal of Anthropology, 48 (2006), 131-143; Reyna, S., Connections: brain, mind 
and culture in a social anthropology, Routledge, London/New York, 2002. 
9 GRaCia, J., «What can philosophers learn from neuroscience», in: hanna, P., An 
Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 10, Athens, Atenier, pp. 27-36.
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naturalism underlying this neuroethics is effectively reductionist because, on 
the one hand, it reduces what there is to the physical universe and, on the other 
hand, it considers that the only truths and the only substantive knowledge is 
that which comes from natural facts10.
The neuroethics resulting from the naturalist approach is reductionist and 
is marked by a clear hermeneutical deficit since it considers that the only valid 
and solvent explanation of morality is that deriving from the neurophysiological 
bases («natural events») and does not accept that in addition to the natural 
scientific method, there are other complementary approaches which can 
provide an adequate account of human morality. Can we circumscribe the 
whole scope of morality in the human being to «natural events»? Doing so 
implies serious problems for human beings’ ability to understand themselves. I 
now look briefly at some of these problems.
The first problem deriving from the (uncritical) naturalistic neuroethics 
is that of freedom. Is it possible to give due account of freedom from the 
neuroscientific approach? Because freedom cannot be demonstrated by the 
natural method of neuroscience, does it lead to the denial of its existence in the 
human being?11. 
The second problem concerns responsibility and neuroscience. Cognitive 
science explains the causal relationship between human action and the physical 
body (the brain). This relationship would have to be analysed if explaining the 
causes of the action, eliminating the distinction between cause and motives, 
does not prevent us from clearly illuminating what it means to be responsible12. 
A third problem with naturalistic approaches is that they tend to confuse 
10 A current formulation of such naturalism could be expressed as the position that 
holds that nature —understood as the physical universe—  is all there is; second, that the only 
basic truths are the truths of nature; and, third, that the only substantive knowledge is that of 
natural facts. Cf. audi, R., La percepción moral, Madrid, Avarigani, 2015, p. 28. As Habermas 
recalls, «The ontologization of the knowledge by natural sciences forms a naturalistic image of 
the world and reduces it to hard facts». Therefore «that is not science, but bad metaphysics». 
Cf. HabeRmaS, J., Entre naturalismo y religión, Barcelona, Paidós, 2006, p. 214.
11 The conclusions of Benjamin Libet’s experiments carried out from neuroscientific 
approaches are well known. Cf. Libet, B., «Do we have free will?», in: Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 6, nº 8-9, 1999, pp. 47. Many authors have rebutted his conclusions, but this is not 
the place to examine them. Later in the paper I refer to critical neurohermeneutics as a way 
of overcoming naturalism, on the one hand, and an inflationary concept of freedom on the 
other. 
12 Several authors in the conceptual matrix of philosophical hermeneutics have criticised 
the deficiency of an approach devoid of hermeneutical foundation. Cf. HabeRmaS, J., Entre 
naturalismo y religión, Barcelona, Paidós, 2006, p. 194 and ss. More recently, in the line of 
Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics we find criticism of certain neuroscientific 
expositions. According to this author, only in the framework of the narration does the human 
being learn the reasons for being responsible; cf. DiReCKxSenS, G., «Responsibility and the 
Physical Body. Paul Ricoeur on Analytical Philosophy of Language, Cognitive Science, and 
the Task of Phenomenological Hermeneutics», in: Philosophy Today, vol 61, issue 3, Summer 
2017, pp. 573-593. 
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neural bases with the ethical foundations of moral behaviour. As a result, is 
neuroethics not left on the brink of the famous naturalistic fallacy?13. 
A fourth problem is identity and recognition. Human prosociality is 
frequently explained from evolutionary approaches14. However, it would be 
convenient to pause and determine whether the biological capacity of the 
human being to reciprocate is the same as the ethical category of recognition 
as it has been understood and defended from ethical theories15. 
Fifth, some authors also tend to bundle norms and moral values with «social 
norms and values»; do they really reduce ethical values to socially agreed norms? 
Under the aegis of naturalism, morality is confused with prosociality, which 
in turn is conflated with evolutionarily described natural facts16. Undoubtedly, 
morality has a lot to do with the social dimension of the human being, but is ethics 
reduced to the preconventional and conventional stages of moral behaviour?17. 
A sixth problem involving naturalistic neuroethics is what can be understood 
by justice and if justice really is understood once efforts have been made to 
naturalise it. Does justice not lose its meaning? Again, the problem that arises 
is a reduction in normative capacity that makes attempts to regulate the action 
beyond the conventions reached by a certain group a fatuous exercise. A 
naturalised idea of justice entails a serious hermeneutical deficit to the extent 
that it contradicts and eliminates the pretensions of validity that are intrinsic 
to the agent’s understanding of human behaviour.
These are just some of the main problems presented by naturalistic 
neuroethics. It should not be forgotten that the neuroscientific perspective 
can provide important knowledge about some aspects involved in human 
action, such as the brain mechanisms that make such action possible from a 
neurophysiological point of view. But this is only a point of view characterised 
by the observer’s perspective on empirically observable facts. Of course it is not 
the only one and perhaps not (the most) adequate, depending on the objective. 
It is hermeneutics that allows us to distinguish the methodological perspective 
of the natural sciences from other possible methodologies to give a reason for 
13 Cf. Ayala, F., «The Biological Roots of Morality». Biology and Philosophy nº 2 (1987), 
pp. 235-252; CoRtina, A., Neuroética y neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral, 
Madrid, Tecnos, 2011, pp. 77-96; GRaCia, J., «¿Incurre la teoría del proceso dual del juicio 
moral de Joshua Greene en falacia naturalista?», Pensamiento 72 (2016), nº. 273, pp. 809-826.
14 An example of these naturalistic neuroethical approaches can be found in de Waal, F., 
ChuRChland, P. S., Pievani, T. y PaRmigiani, E., Evolved Morality. The Biology and Philosophy of 
Human Conscience, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2014.
15  Cf. GRaCia, J., «De la reciprocidad neurobiológica al reconocimiento ético a través 
de la fenomenología hermenéutica», in: Sylla, Bernhard (ed.), Intencionalidade e cuidado, 
Riberao, Humus, 2017, pp. 257-268. 
16 A good example of this can be found in ChuRChland, P., Braintrust. What neuroscience 
tell us about morality, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 10.
17 In Kohlberg’s line, I believe it is important not to reduce ethics to preconventional or 
even conventional stages, especially considering the importance of conscience (and not just 
group pressure) in determining how people behave. 
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morality. In this way, hermeneutics arises as a critical instance against the 
pretension of some naturalistic neuroscientific versions that reduce the scope 
of morality to empirically testable natural facts.
3. CRitiCal heRmeneutiCS aS the foundation of neuRoethiCS
At this point it is important to note that critical hermeneutics contributes to 
a more adequate understanding of the neuroscientific explanation. In the light 
of hermeneutics the neuroscientific explanation is understood and recognises 
itself as one way, but not the only way, of explaining morality. This aspect is 
not to the detriment of neuroscience’s explanations of phenomena that occur 
in the brain system as a base and centre of operations of the activities of the 
human organism. However it does imply an unquestionable gain in terms of 
reflexivity and therefore a critical way to prevent us from falling into what we 
might call a neuromythical understanding of the world. Let us examine the 
gains of considering the critical instance of neurohermeneutics.
Among the undeniable achievements of neuroscientific research is the 
rebuttal of certain «neuromyths» that have infiltrated people’s way of thinking 
and have been fuelled by ignorance of the research itself, by inappropriate 
ways of disseminating science or by the desire (naive or deliberate) to apply it, 
without further scientific affirmations, to practical contexts in order to develop 
action guidelines that have a considerable impact on people’s ways of life18. 
In the face of neuromyths, neuroscientific research has rightly called for 
rigour and caution. It is part of the ethics of neuroscientific research to enquire 
into the emergence of neuromyths and the commitment to the precautionary 
principle, and the rigorous requirement to detect and avoid them19. Indeed, 
rigour and caution are two indispensable elements of scientific explanation 
that should always be kept in mind to prevent new, distorted neuromyths from 
18 For instance, in the field of education, in its 2002 report the OECD warned against 
the emergence of neuromyths: «With the advent of functional imaging technology, cognitive 
neuroscience is beginning to produce important research on the neural foundations of 
cognitive performance. Current research results have sparked a tremendous amount of 
commentary and speculation among scientists, researchers, education specialists, and policy-
makers. Since such research proves to have merit, many want to know how educational 
practice can be improved or enriched by the application of these research findings. As a result 
of both pressure to improve overall school performance and excitement and interest about 
education that could be brain-based, many myths and misconceptions have arisen around 
the mind and brain outside of the scientific community. Teachers and educational specialists 
are eager to put into practice what they have read in the popular press, and policymakers 
want to enact effective educational policy by using research-based information». OCDE, 
Understanding the brain, Paris, 2002, pp. 69-70.
19 Cf. The brain and learning, OECD Publications Service, Paris, 2007; and HoWaRd-
JoneS, P., Introducing Neuroeducational Research. Neuroscience, education and the brain from 
contexts to practice , Routledge, Oxon, 2010. 
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appearing. Hence a rigorous and cautious neuroscientific explanation, duly 
contrasted by empirical observation, will never be placed on the same level 
as another that lacks these elements and upholds affirmations that are not 
endorsed by experimentation.
But in turn, critical hermeneutics warns that the neuroscientific explanation 
itself can become a neuromythical conception of the world, because if 
the neuroscientific approach does not take consciousness of itself as an 
interpretation of the world, it will end up identifying with the world itself. This 
occurs when the neuroscientific understanding of the world is considered to be 
the only valid understanding that reflects the world as it is (and not the natural, 
empirically observable world). Paradoxically, science itself, which emerged to 
overcome previous mythical conceptions of the world, would end up generating 
its own myth, precisely because of its lack of reflexivity. If this were to happen, 
we might say that we were witnessing a new form of «reification of the image 
of the world»20. 
Faced with this mode of naive or uncritical neuroscience, the critical 
hermeneutics approach contributes to generating a reflexive and critical 
neuroscience that also affects its scope and limits. Critical hermeneutics allows 
us to see not only that neuroscientific approaches are amenable to revision 
and criticism, but that the image of the neuroscientific world is neither the 
only possible nor the most adequate lens through which to focus on the whole 
of the world, for example, in the field of morality. In fact, it is essential that 
the neuroscientific discourse does not aim to go beyond the «practical barriers 
of naturalistic self-objectification» but often recognises in the background the 
access hermeneutics gives to the world of life.
Die praktischen Schranken der naturalistischen Selbstobjektivierung 
bestätigen die Hartnäckigkeit eines epistemischen Dualismus, der nicht in 
der Differenz zwischen Lebenswelt und objektiver Welt als solcher, sondern in 
dem Umstand begründet ist, daß der hermeneutische Zugang zur Lebenswelt 
ausschließlichen Charakter hat, also nicht durch einen anderen ersetzt 
werden kann. Gewiß, das Sprachspiel des physikalischen Messens muß wie 
alle anderen lebensweltlichen Praktiken durch Teilnahme eingeübt werden, 
bevor sein propositionaler Gehalt in der Form expliziter Regeln beschrieben 
und «verstanden» werden kann21.
20 Here I use a well-known expression from Habermas not only to counter the scientific 
explanation of the mythical explanation, but also to emphasise that the neuroscientific image 
itself can come to be reified. Cf. HabeRmaS, J., Teoría de la acción comunicativa I, Madrid, 
Taurus, 1987, pp. 82-99. The problem is not to determine whether there are alternative 
standards of rationality, nor the limitations of a principle of hermeneutical charity, but 
whether neuroscience itself has constructed an image of the world that leaves out the 
moral dimension irreducible to empirical nature and becomes the standard of cognitive-
instrumental adequacy.
21 HabeRmaS, J., «Von den Weltbildern zur Lebenswelt», Philosophische Texte, Band 5, 
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, pp. 263-264
PENSAMIENTO, vol. 77 (2021), núm. 295 pp. 481-490
 J. GRACIA CALADÍN, CRITICAL NEUROHERMENEUTICS 489
Critical hermeneutics allows us to overcome the drawbacks of a 
neuromythical conception of the world by focusing precisely on the reflexivity 
and critical nature of any interpretation. The way in which science is imbricated 
in the world of life is still problematic, and setting out to simply replace the 
world of people’s lives with a specific neuroscientific vision of the world involves 
the devaluation of substantial traditions that have given and continue to give 
meaning to people’s existence, and implies an irreparable loss in terms of the 
agents’ understanding of themselves and their experiences22. I do not doubt that 
these particular traditions and conceptions of the world might sometimes call 
for revision, and the explanations offered by scientific theories can contribute 
directly or indirectly to this, but they must always be properly contextualised. 
It seems that neuroscience is not the most appropriate candidate to review 
the existential self-understanding of the experiences of the agents themselves. 
Rather, I believe it is the critical hermeneutics of the social and human sciences 
duly applied to the different spheres of society that really contributes to the 
emancipation of society in all its spheres.
In this regard, neuroscientific explanations are far from neutral, and when 
they aspire to reach all areas of the world of life, they lead to the subordination 
of a unilateral rationality and restrict this world to the empirical-instrumental. 
Naturalistic neuroscientific research is not enough to combat the closed, 
unreflective and uncritical nature of neuromyths. Any neuroscientific explanation 
must be grounded on the aegis of reflexivity and critical self-understanding, so 
that it becomes aware of its scope and its limitations. 
The way to overcome neuroethical naturalism as a reified image of the 
world is to advocate a critical neurohermeneutics. We speak of critical 
neurohermeneutics (not simply neurohermeneutics) because the pretensions of 
validity and the moment of the unconditioned are part of the self-understanding 
we have as agents. This point of view is not that of the observing scientist 
who develops neuroscientific theories (according to the natural scientific 
method), but neither that of the relativist who eliminates both objective truth 
and intersubjective validity. It is rather the critical point of view of the moral 
22 This phenomenon was denounced by Habermas as «colonization of the world of life» 
alluding to the analyses of Marx, Weber and Parson. Cf. HabeRmaS, J., Teoría de la acción 
comunicativa, Madrid, Taurus, 2003, pp. 451ss. However, in the phenomenological matrix of 
hermeneutics it was originally exposed almost a century ago by Edmund Husserl in The crisis 
of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. The image of the real world provided 
by «objective science» is concretised in the exclusion of issues such as the meaning of the 
world or the values  of life. If the natural sciences are concerned only with the facts and their 
relationships and this vision has become the predominant conception in the ordinary world, 
then this world itself has derived from the product of science, nullifying the potential and 
significant wealth of life itself. Phenomenology and hermeneutics reveal the need to become 
aware and reflect that the place of objective science is not that of the world of life. The crisis 
of objectivism lies precisely in having renounced one’s own scientificity by reducing the truth 
to natural facts and a mathematical ideal of accuracy. Cf. HuSSeRl, E., The crisis of European 
sciences and transcendental phenomenology, Evanston, Northwester University, 1970. §§ 33-ss.
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agent knowing that, as an embodied agent, they understand that their moral 
behaviour does not attend to neuronal mechanisms, but to their responsibility 
for themselves in their own body.
Die Grenzen naturalistischer Selbstobjektivierung wird mit Beschreibungen 
überschritten, unter denen sich Personen nicht mehr als Personen 
wiedererkenen können. Naturwissenschaftliche Beschreibungen beziehen 
sich —über die Abstraktionsstufen theoretischen Begriffsbildung vermittelt— 
auf ein raumzeitlich identifizierbares und grundsätzlich nomologisch 
erklärbares, also deterministisches Geschehen […] Die Schwierigkeit besteht 
darin, daß sich die Sprachspiele, Vokabulare und Erklärungsmuster, deren wir 
uns in solchen Fällen jeweils bedienen müssen, nicht aufeinander reduzieren 
Lassen23.
ConCluSion
Critical neurohermeneutics allows us to overcome the deficiencies 
of (uncritical) naturalistic neuroethics because it is grounded in critical 
hermeneutics. Critical neurohermeneutics starts from the recognition of the 
hermeneutical presuppositions of understanding and therefore does not take 
for granted that natural facts are the reality itself. On the contrary, it recognises 
the undeniable contribution of the natural scientific method to understand 
the cerebral mechanisms underlying moral conduct, but without reducing 
the moral conduct to these mechanisms. Rather, its foundation lies in critical 
hermeneutics without neglecting the consideration and analysis of the moral 
reasons of the agent. 
But, secondly, recognising the foundation of critical hermeneutics for 
neuroethics or moral neuroeducation allows us to overcome a neuromythical 
conception of the world. Uncritical naturalism can easily become a reified 
image of the world. Faced with this, critical hermeneutics allows a greater 
awareness and reflexivity of the place that corresponds to the neuroscientific 
contribution in the way it explains natural facts.
Critical neurohermeneutics raises a critical voice against neuroethical 
proposals that aim to reduce the normative character of ethics to socially 
agreed norms. The normative force of ethics transcends the parameters of 
social conventions, arises as a regulatory instance and offers an argumentative 
framework that transcends the particular interests of certain social groups.
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